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ORIGINS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
IN ENGLAND
MARGARET BUCKLEY

I.

INTRODUCTION

In early times, before there existed any conception of diplomatic
status or diplomatic immunity as such, the need existed for one sovereign
to communicate with another, to make treaties and generally to transact
such business as might be necessary. These communications were made
by way of "diplomatic missions" which meant that the sovereign chose
a favoured person or persons to go to a foreign State with a specific
purpose. Often, the sovereign would use priests and monks to undertake
his mission and if he did, their status of vir religiosus was sufficient to
ensure their safety.' In all other cases, the practice was for the sovereign
to issue a safe-conduct to the foreign sovereign or his envoy, such as the
letters patent of October 30, 1200,2 which granted the King of Scotland
and his suite "a safe conduct to come to us, to stay at our court and to
return safely and securely to your own country."' But this was a complicated process; application to the foreign sovereign was necessary in
each individual case and an unprotected messenger was required to go
to the foreign sovereign and to return
abroad with a letter of request
4
home with the letters patent.
The grant of safe-conduct was sometimes unnecessary, for example
under a treaty which made special provision for the exchange of envoys.
The Treaty of September 30, 1471, between King Edward IV of England
and Duke Frantois of Brittany provided that for the duration of the
truce between England and France, ambassadors and messengers from
one court to the other should not need any safe-conduct except the letters
they carried from their sovereign. 5
These are the origins of the concept of diplomacy, at least in England,' but England was not the home of the rapidly developing ideas on
diplomatic exchanges. It was in Renaissance Italy that the origins of
diplomacy as we understand it today are to be found. But, even in Italy,
an ambassador was someone sent to procure something or to carry a
* Lecturer in Laws, University College, London, England.
1. See letters of January 4, 1220, De forma Treugae Regi Franciae Mittenda and of
March 22, 1226, De Tractato Pacis cum Rege FranciaeResumendo, in 1 RYMER 236 and 285.
2. 1 RYMVER 121.
3. The continental practice was similar. See the safe-conduct granted by Henry III to
the King of Navarre's son on August 25, 1242 1 Lettres de Rois 72.
4. See the letter of July 20, 1212, from King John to the Court of Flanders, 1 RYMER
161-2.
5. 3 D.mONT, Part I, at 438.
6. See SCHWARZENBERGER, FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
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message and to return after the mission was completed; there was no
concept, until the mid-fifteenth century at least, of a permanent mission.
Much light is thrown on this subject by Bernard du Rosier's Short Treatise about Ambassadors, published in 1437.7 Its author was a man of
wide diplomatic experience, accustomed to serving on missions, and he
wrote the book for practical use by diplomats. Du Rosier was of the
opinion that ambassadors possessed an immunity in person and property
from the law while engaged in the mission, and he said that these privileges stemmed from the civil and canon law. He allowed the immunities
to extend to the regular members of the Ambassador's suite. There cannot be any dispute that Du Rosier's premise or basis of the immunity
was not the established law, but rather some kind of international convention and custom.
Du Rosier had no concept of permanent embassies, although such
missions had existed in at least two countries until about one hundred
years before his time. It is interesting to note that as early as the reign
of Edward I in England, English procurators were established at the
French court on a permanent or semi-permanent basis and vice versa.
This practice died out in the mid-fourteenth century and was not revived
for the next two hundred years."
Diplomatic activity in England did not become pronounced until the
end of the fifteenth century: 9 it seems certain that Henry VII and Henry
VIII had a Venetian envoy at least. Certainly, the main type of ambassador in the Middle Ages was the papal nuncio, whose office was sacred.' °
Gradually, the practice of a resident Ambassador and suite grew
up, and by the early sixteenth century there were several resident ambassadors in England. As their numbers increased, a new problem arose:
what was their position with regard to the law of the country in which
they were stationed? The theorists from the earliest times had talked
in vague and unsettled terms of the ambassador's alleged personal immunity. The idea was one of "personal law," that the ambassador carried his own law with him and he should be tried by that law as opposed
to the law of the country in which he resided. At the time this idea was
developed there was no practical application except in relation to the
short visits made by an envoy to a foreign state. This early idea developed, theoretically, over the centuries and it is probable that by the sixteenth century the theory, or fiction, of extraterritoriality had come to
stay. The exact date of practical origin of the fiction has always been a
7. Du Rosier was Provost of Toulouse when he wrote it and he later became Archbishop
of Toulouse.

8. See

MAT'INOLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY

66.

9. There is some doubt as to the exact date.
10. There was a certain Roman influence here: See V. E. HRABAR, De Legatis et
Legationibus Tractatus varii; De Legatorum Jure Tractatuum Catalogus Completus.
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matter for dispute between historians and lawyers, and it seems unlikely
that it will ever be resolved to everyone's satisfaction."
Adair, choosing the sixteenth century as his starting point for the
growth of the fiction, based his theory on the fact that resident embassies became more numerous; thus the national law increased in importance, and the attempt was made to assert it over everyone resident in
the country. Naturally, this produced a conflict between the national
law and the alleged status of the ambassador, which finally resolved itself with the gradual introduction of the fiction of extraterritoriality.
Another possible reason for the growth of the fiction at this stage was
that the religious difficulties in Europe at the time produced, in turn,
diplomatic difficulties, as when a Roman Catholic envoy came to England after Henry VIII's reign; so it is probable that envoys were recognized as being in a special position.
As one might expect in looking back at the ideas and practice of
the sixteenth century, the theory was often different from the practice;
at some stages, the theory seemed to be in advance of the practice, and
at other times, the converse was true. Once the fiction of extraterritoriality had evolved, its application both in theory and practice can be distinguished according to whether the law applicable was civil or criminal.
II.

12
IMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL LAW

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the theorists were doubtful as to whether diplomatic immunity existed from criminal suits and,
if so, how far it extended. In practice the immunity was becoming recognized. Coke tells us of Pole's case" in which Pole, being a rebel and traitor, fled from England to Rome, whence he was sent by the Pope to
France as Ambassador. Henry VIII, on good terms with France but not
with Rome, took the opportunity to demand Pole's return for trial.
He was unsuccessful. Coke used this case as an example to support his
theory of immunity but it would seem to belong more properly to the
early law of extradition.
As a general theory, foreign writers upheld the personal inviolability
of ambassadors. Dolet allowed its existence' 4 whereas Brunus modified
the absolute view and said that ambassadors were protected if they behaved properly and did not stray beyond their functions." But there
11. Oppenheim's International Law would date the fiction from the seventeenth century;
SCHWARZEINBERGER, op. cit. supra note 6, also favours a later date. Grotius used the expression "fictione simile constituerentur quasi extra territorium" in II De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
ch. 18, U14 (1646 Ed.) for the first time. Adair would take the 16th century. ADAm, ExTFRRiTORIAITY OF AwBASSADORS IN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES.
12. See ADAIR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 15-68.
13. TEMP. 1509-1547. See 4TH INSTITUE.
14. See Da IMMUNITATE LEGATORUM (1541).
15. DE LEGATIONIBUS (1548).
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existed instances at about the same period of time which show that the
immunity of the ambassador was not always recognized in England during this period. In 1511, Girolamo Bonvisi, the special nuncio at the
English Court, persuaded the Spanish Ambassador to tell him that England and Spain had formed an alliance against France. He then imparted
the information to the French. Wolsey kept him in the Tower for some
time, a flagrant violation of his immunity. This action could be justified
on the ground that Bonvisi had betrayed the Pope, who had favoured
war with France.' 6 A similar reason was probably behind Wolsey's arrest of Louis de Praet, the Emperor's Ambassador in 1524. De Praet had
written to his sovereign, advising him to complete a peace treaty with
France with whom the allies were at war. Wolsey discovered these activities, and he had de Praet arrested to await punishment. 17 But these
were matters of politics. As one authority has pointed out:
Ambassadors were not, as a class, much given to homicide,
robbery with violence or the more spectacular forms of rape
... the crimes [they] were likely to be charged with were political.'
In 1556, the French Ambassador in England was found to be involved
in Sir Henry Dudley's plot against Queen Mary. The Privy Council
did not know whether he could be dealt with as a conspirator without
violating the jus gentium. The decision was essentially political in that
the Ambassador was not punished because a war with France was considered a possible consequence. He was recalled.' 9 In 1569 the Spanish
Ambassador was imprisoned in his house on the principle that he had
acted beyond the instructions of his sovereign, thereby being reduced
to the position of a private citizen.2"
At about the same time, a new theory was gaining ground which appears to have been based on the prevailing political situation. It is possible
that the practice led to the adoption of the theory after the Bishop of
Rosse's case. 2 ' The Bishop was the Scottish Ambassador at the English
Court and it was discovered that he was involved in various plots against
the Crown. Because of the difficulties attaching to his diplomatic position,
five of the most distinguished civil lawyers of the day22 were consulted.
They said:
We are of opinion that an Ambassador procuring an insurrection or rebellion in the Prince's country towards whom he is
16.
17.
18.
19.

CAL. OF S.P., I SPANISH 552.
Ibid. III Spanish at 50-56, 62-65.
MATTINGLY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 274.
ANTOINE DE NOAiLLES, CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, VENICE, 460, no. 495.
20. See BYNKERSHOEK, DE JuRE COMPETENT 209; CAL. or S.P., SPANISH, I 97-172.
21. See Murdin's State Papers, p. 18, dated October 17, 1571 in THE HISTORY Or THE
MOST RENOWNED AND VICroRiOUS PRINCESS ELIZABETH (Camden ed. 1688).
22. Daniel Lewis, Valentine Dale, William Drury, William Aubrey and Henry Jones.
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Ambassador, ought not, jure gentium et civili romanorum, to
enjoy the privileges otherwise due to an Ambassador; but that
he may, notwithstanding, be punished for the same.
This practical decision may well have led Gentili, writing after consultation about Mendoza's position in the Throgmorton plot of 1583-1584,2'
to say that conspiracy by an Ambassador against the sovereign of the
country in which he resided would render him liable to expulsion, whereas an actual overt act as a result of conspiracy would render him liable
to punishment there.24
Hotman, also consulted about Mendoza's position, was of much
the same opinion as Brunus and said that imprisonment was possible for
conspirators against the sovereign and also for a crime committed against
a private person. 25 At the beginning of the seventeenth century the attitudes and theories in England began to change. It may have been that
with the last of the Tudors the age of the "plots" and intrigues disappeared. No historian would pretend that the Court of James I or Charles
I was the hotbed of political intrigue that made the Tudor Court so notable, especially in the latter half of the sixteenth century. So Kirchner,
writing in 1604,26 drew a new distinction between crimes committed
against the law of God and against the law of nature on the one hand,
and crimes invented by man, on the other. He asserted that the Ambassador was punishable only when he committed a crime of the former
type.

27

Kirchner's ideas were adopted to a certain extent by Coke, who
refers to Marche's case28 in which proceedings for piracy were sought
to be brought against one who claimed to be the ambassador of the King
of Morocco. Although the reasons are not very clear, the proceedings
were disallowed. Coke's ideas on immunity were to some extent the product of his age, although certain aspects do not appear to have a sound
basis. 29 As far as immunity from criminal suits is concerned, he is firm
and straightforward:
Ambassadors ought to be kept from all injuries and wrongs,
and by the law of all countries and of all nations, they ought
to be safe and sure in every place, in so much that it is not lawful to hurt the ambassadors of our enemies and herewith
agreeth the civil law.
23. DE LEGATIorMus, LiBRi Taxs (1585).
24. Cf. I HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 96-98, where the opinion
expressed is that an overt attempt at rebellion or treason is punishable with death "by the
law of nations."
25. See DE LA CHARGE ET DIGNITL DE L'A.ABASSADEUR (1604).
26. See LEGATUS.
27. Cf. GRoTrus' IDEAS.
28. 3 Bulstr. 27 (1615) ; see 4TH INsTTrmE 153.
29. See Cvir. bna
=.
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Indeed, he takes his theory to what might be felt to be inordinate lengths,
for he goes on:
And if a banished man be sent as ambassador to the place
from whence he is banished, he may not be detained or offended
there. 0
But there were more learned juristic opinions to be sought. In 1624,
Inojosa, the Spanish Ambassador, accused Buckingham of conspiring to
dethrone James I. Dr. Welwood and Sir Robert Cotton were consulted
as to Inojosa's punishment. Dr. Welwood denied the existence of any
special privileges for ambassadors, 8 but Cotton thought that ambassadors were exempt from trial in the ordinary courts. One authority, at
least, is of the opinion that political expediency may well have led to
Cotton's view. 2
By this time the "law of nations" theory had reached its peak. Following Kirchner to a certain extent, Coke and Grotius expounded their
views. To Coke, there were specific offences for which the ambassador
could be punished:
A crime contra jus gentium, for example, treason, felony, adultery or any other crime which is against the law of nations.
But for crimes malum prohibitum which were not malum in se jure gentium nor contra jus gentium, the ambassador, in Coke's view, could not
be liable.88
Grotius, considered by many historians to be the first authority on
the extraterritoriality of ambassadors, certainly had the clearest juristic
ideas of his generation. Converting Kirchner's law of nature into law of
nations, Grotius maintained that ambassadors had complete immunity
on the reasoning that the ordinary law of the country, applying to all in
it, is changed by the common consent of nations to exclude ambassadors
who are, by fiction, extra territorium.4
In 1654, a case occurred, the outcome of which supported the theories of Gentili. M. de Baas, the French Ambassador to London, was ordered to leave within twenty-four hours, for conspiring to kill Cromwell.38
From this case, it would appear that despite the theories of immunity
prevalent at the time, practical politics infringed on theory when the
need arose. Zouch8" followed to a large extent the ideas of Grotius and
30. See 4TH INSTITUE, 153.

31. His paper is among the Caesar papers in the British
124ab.fo.411), May 7, 1624.
32. See ADAIR, op. cit. supra note 11 at 24, 25.
33. See Case of Don Pantaleon San, 5 Howell's St. Tr. 462 (1654).
34. II DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. 18, 4.
35. 2 THURLOE, STATE PAPERS.
36. SOLUTIO QUAESTIONIS VETERIS ET NOVAE (1657).

Museum

(Add. MS.
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Wicquefort,3 7 writing a book of diplomatic practice, conceded full immunity to the ambassador on the grounds that he represented the actual person of the sovereign. Hale, in 1736, preferred Gentili's view, and
said that by the law of nations, an ambassador could be put to death if
he made an overt attempt at rebellion. Bynkershoek, 5 followed the theories of Grotius.
Despite the variance between the learned theorists, it would appear
that theory alone did not play the dominant part in the largely political
problem of diplomatic immunity. The theories ranged from complete
immunity to complete absence of immunity, and while the jurists were
evolving their intricate rules, the records fail to reveal even one ambassador who was prosecuted 9 or indeed, any ambassador who was seriously affected by loss of goods. The sensible view may well be that the
fiction of extraterritoriality was the product of the practice, the justification for the treatment of ambassadors, rather than an idea in the vanguard which led to the granting of diplomatic immunity in practice. As
Hurst pointed out, the practice of immunity was far more important
than the theorists' arguments for or against it. Hurst went so far as to
maintain that there was no precedent for a foreign diplomatic agent to
be subjected to the criminal jurisdiction of the country in which he
served."
III.

IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL JURISDICTION

The early writers on this aspect of diplomatic immunity based their
ideas not on the fiction of extraterritoriality, but on the doctrines of
Roman law. Ulpian was the originator of the Roman idea that the ambassador was not liable for contracts made before he assumed office, but
only for those made during his term of office. The reason for this distinction was, as Gentili said, that if ambassadors were not liable for
contracts made by them, no-one would contract with them." Octavian
Maggi thought that ambassadors were immune even for contracts made
during their embassy,42 but in 1507, De Puebla, Spanish Ambassador to
London, expected to be imprisoned because he was unable to pay his
debts. 3 Conversely, in 1556, the Council refused to allow the landlord
of the French Ambassador, de Noailles, to sue for the rent owed to him.
Ayrault was another voice in favour of complete immunity.4 4
37. L'AMBASSAD-tJR ET sEs FONCTIONS (1687).

38. DE Foao LEGATORUM.
39. The Case of Don Pantaleon San is quoted by some authorities as disproving this
point, but in that case, it was established that Don Pantaleon was not protected simply by
virtue of his position as brother of the Portuguese ambassador; see 5 Howell's St. Tr. 462
(1654).
40. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1950); see also R. v. Guerchy, 1 Blackstone 545
(1765), in which the French amabassador was indicted, and the subsequent nolle prosequi.
41. Bk. II, op. cit. supra note 34, at ch. 16, ff 74.
42. DE LEGATO, LmRi

43. CAL. of S.P. I. SP

Duo, fos. 6-86 (1566).

INis, no. 552, Oct. 5, 1507.

44. L'ORDRE, FORMALITt ET INSTRUCTION JUDICIAIRE, pt. IV, f1 13 and 15.
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The unstable position of the law, at least in the eyes of its onlookers,
was further emphasized in the two cases concerning Antonio Foscarini,
the Venetian Ambassador. In 1612, one of his creditors was arrested for
demanding money owed, and seizing his coach,46 but by 1615 when Foscarini still refused to pay his debts, the Privy Council ordered him to
pay, and authorised the creditor to seize his goods if he defaulted.4 6
Coke had yet another idea. He said that contracts which were "good
jure gentium" were enforceable against the ambassador. In this respect,
more than a little of his authority was undermined by Blackstone who
observed that no ambassador was answerable in England for a civil
suit, and noticing Coke's observations he added that so few cases had
arisen where the privilege was either claimed or disputed, that the law
books were silent on this question before Queen Anne's reign."
Grotius48 developed the theory that ambassadors were immune with
regard to suits concerning moveables, but with regard to immovables he
thought that they were subject to the jurisdiction under the doctrine of
lex loci rei sitae. Bynkershoek modified this theory by suggesting that
those movables and immovables not essential to the ambassador in the
performance of his functions were subject to the local jurisdiction.49
In fact the situation was rather different from the ideas of the theorists, as was shown by the famous case of the Russian Ambassador to
London, Mattueoj's case. 50 Mattueof was recalled in 1708 but he had
various creditors who, on learning of his imminent departure, decided to
take action. They removed him with force from his carriage, seized his
sword, hat and stick, and took him to a public house where he was placed
in the custody of an officer of justice. Bail was quickly arranged and the
enraged ambassador protested to the Queen, wrote to the Secretary of
State and departed forthwith for Russia. The Czar demanded that the
offenders should be punished and they were duly tried in the Court of
Queen's Bench for, inter alia, assaulting and arresting the ambassador.
In fact, the Queen was in a very awkward position. It was no crime to
arrest private persons for debt in 1708, nor was it a crime by statute to
arrest an ambassador for debt. However, the Czar demanded appeasement and after examination by the Privy Council, seventeen people were
committed to prison. Holt, C.J., presided over the court in which they
were tried. The real question at issue was, could an ambassador be arrested for debt? Sir James Montague, A.-G., justified the negative argument on the ground of public policy. He said that sovereigns would be
cautious of sending ambassadors to England if their privileges could be
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

State Papers, Domestic, James I, 70, no. 79, Sept. 29, 1612.
AcTs oF P.C. 1615-16, p. 291 (1615).
I BL. Comm. 252 (17th Ed.).
Op. cit., supra Rook II, ch. 18, ff 9.
TRArrf DU JUGE COMPATENT DES AMBASSADEURS.

10 Mod. Rep. 4 (1709).
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"invaded for the preservation of the property of a private subject." He
went on to observe that "the person of an ambassador has ever been held
sacred and inviolable by the law of nations" and that his goods were not
liable to arrest. He referred to the fiction that the ambassador represents
the person of his sovereign and becomes "extraparochial." Despite the
strong argument for the defendants that if the Attorney-General's argument were accepted, they would be without remedy for the recovery of
their debt, they were all convicted on the facts by the jury. The question
of law, as to how far those facts disclosed a criminal offence, was reserved, to be later argued before the judges. Such argument did not
take place, possibly because it was apparent that the facts as found by
the jury did no more than create the offence of "manhandling the ambassador" which was not a crime in itself. Lord Mansfield attempted to
justify the fact that the case was taken no further, by declaring that the
law of nations was always part of the law of England and the infraction
of the law of nations could only be a misdemeanor punishable by fine,
imprisonment or pillory, all of which were so small a sentence as to be a
fresh insult to the Czar.5 ' In fact, of course, there was no penalty that
could legally be imposed on the convicted defendants. Diplomatically,
the Queen chose to appease the Czar in another way, she caused an Act
to be passed which declared all proceedings against ambassadors void.
The Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1 70852 states in the preamble the reasons for its existence, viz. the behaviour of "several turbulent and disorderly persons.. . . contrary to the law of nations and in prejudice of the
rights and privileges which ambassadors and other publick ministers
authorised and received as such have at all times been thereby possessed
of and ought to be kept sacred and inviolable."
Section 3, the main part of the Act, laid down that all writs and
processes against any ambassador or his domestic servants shall be null
and void if they could result in their arrest or imprisonment or the
seizure of their chattels.
Section 4 added that anyone issuing such writ or process was liable
to penalties to be decreed by the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, or any two of them.
The passing of this Act led to another problem; or more correctly
one should say that the Act set up a trend which led to a problem. It was
with regard to the interpretation of 7 Anne, c. 12, that the question first
arose. Was it declaratory of the common law or was it new law? There
are, and have been since the eighteenth century, two lines of thought
on this matter. On the one hand, virtually all the international theorists
and judges' obiter dicta on the subject have supported the notion that
the Act was merely declaratory of the common law position. On the
51. See Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 1480 (1764).
52. 7 Anne ch. 12.
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other hand, various learned writers on English law who have considered
the matter in no little detail, and certain decided cases on the point itself,
have preferred the view that the Act was not declaratory of the common
law because the principles of international comity, or international law,
or simply jus gentium comprised in the Act were not part of English law
prior to 1709 and consequently could not have been incorporated into
the common law.
The first view, that the Act was simply a declaration of the common
law, was first enunciated by Lord Mansfield in 1764:1'
[A]ll that is new in this Act is the clause which gives a summary jurisdiction for the punishment of the infractors of this
law.
He also quoted Lord Talbot as saying, in an earlier case,54 that "the law
of nations in its full extent was part of the law of England." A year later,
in Lockwood v. Coysgarne55 the same judge observed that "the Statute
of 7 Anne was only declatory of the law of nations which . . .was in

full force in these kingdoms." In 1767 Lord Mansfield again endorsed
this view in Heathfield v. Chilton" when he observed that "the privileges of public ministers and their retinue depend upon the law of nations,
which is part of the common law of England. And the Act of Parliament
of 7 Anne, c. 12, did not intend to alter, nor can alter the law of nations."
It would be difficult to find a clearer statement of any judge's interpretation of the premises of an Act, than this. And Lord Mansfield was not
the only learned judge who found this to be the state of the common law
prior to 1709. In Parkinson v. Potter,57 Mathew, J., endorsed the view
that the doctrine of Section 3 of the 1708 Act had been said many times
to be only declaratory of the common law and based on the comity of
nations and added that "it appears from the authorities that the privilege of the embassy is recognised by the common law of England as forming a part of international law."58 Willes, J., adding his judgment in the
case, quoted various sources of this principle with approval.5" Not only
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Triquet v. Bath, supra note 51.
Barbuit's Case Cas. temp. Talbot 281 (1736).
3 Burr. 1676 (1765).
4 Burr. 2015 (1767).
[1885] 16 Q.B.D. 152.
Id. at 157.
59. E.g., 4 VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 8, fT110:
It is not on account of the sacredness of their person that ambassadors cannot be
sued; it is because they are independent of the jurisdiction of the country to which
they are sent.
1 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 453:
From the moment a public minister enters the territory of the state to which he is
sent . . . he is entitled to an entire exemption from the local jurisdiction, both civil
and criminal. Representing the rights, interest and dignity of the sovereign or state
by whom he is delegated, his person is sacred and inviolable . . . The act of sending
the minister on the one hand, and of receiving him on the other, amounts to a tacit
compact between the two states that he shall be subject only to the authority of

his own nation.
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does Willes, J., quote with approval what these jurists said, but he
annexed their views to Mathew, J.'s statements, so that the international
law he referred to was shown to be summarized by those writers.
Lord Warrington in Engelke v. Musmann6° observed:
[I] t is well settled that the questions we have been discussing
do not depend on the Statute [7 Anne, c. 12] but are principles
of the common law having their origin in the idea of the comity
of nations.
More judicial support for this view can be found in the case of
The Amazone61 in which Slesser, L.J., said:
of the
[T]his statute of Queen Anne is by no means exhaustive
2
common law dealing with diplomatic immunity.
Goddard, L.J., made his view even clearer, when he said:
[I]t is well established that it is the common law of this country
that... ambassadors.., are exempt from judicial process. The
statute of Anne is declaratory ... and it really does not achieve

any change in the law. It is not a change in the law, but an addition to the law. 3
The weight of judicial opinion became even heavier when Lord Caldecote in R. v. A.B. 64 said that it was agreed that this privilege derived
from the comity of nations. Therefore, it is evident that the combination
of judicial authority6" and juristic thought have produced a formidable
body (or so it appears) of interpretative authority which seems, prima
facie, to establish beyond any doubt that the principles of international
law on which the doctrine of immunity rests were firmly embedded in
the common law before 1709. Professor Berriedale Keith was of opinion
that the Act (7 Anne, c. 12) was passed, not because punishment could
not be inflicted on the offenders at common law, but because no such
punishment would have been sufficient to appease the Czar.66
It is suggested that it is not possible to decide whether or not the
Act of Anne was simply declaratory of the common law unless one looks
at the relations between international law and English municipal law in
a more general context. Blackstone, a contemporary of Lord Mansfield,
and possibly influenced by his judgments, observed in 1765 that
cit. supra note 27; BYNKERSHOEK, op. cit. supra note 20; MARTENS,
CAUSES CELEBRES DU DROIT DES GENS (1858).
See also GROTIUS, op.

60. [1928] A.C. 433, 458.
61. [1940] P. 40.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id. at 47.
64. [1941] 1 K.B. 454.
65. These expressions of judicial approval have been endorsed in many other cases; most
recently in Empson v. Smith [1965] 3 W.L.R. 380 by Danckwerts, L.J.
66. See 12 Journal of ComparativeLegislation and InternationalLaw 126.
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is here adopted in its full extent by the

common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. And
those Acts of Parliament, which have from time to time been
made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as introductive of
any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental
constitutions of the kingdom."
There is no doubt that judges have applied principles of international law in several English cases. In Viveask v. Becker,68 a case on
consular immunities, Lord Ellenborough agreed to look at the opinions
of international writers on the subject. He observed that "if we saw
clearly that the law of nations was in favour of the privilege, it would
be afforded to the defendant; and it would be our duty rather to extend
than to narrow it." The same judge, in Wolff v. Oxholm, 69 said that where
international law applied and there was no common law rule, international law should be applied by our courts. Lord Eldon had expressed the
same opinion in Dolder v. Huntingfield some years earlier.70 In Novello
v. Toogood7' Abbott, C. J., said that the Act of 1708 "must be construed
according to the common law, of which the law of nations must be
deemed a part." Best, C.J., was even more definite in De Wutz v. Hendricks7" when he observed that the law of nations "is adopted into the
municipal code of every civilised country." In The Duke of Brunswick v.
7
The King of Hanover,'
a case relating to the immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit, the court observed that "there is no English law
applicable to the present subject, unless it can be derived from the law
of nations, which, when ascertained, is to be deemed part of the common
law of England." The same principle was noticed by Lord Alverstone,
7
C.J., in West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. R. :
[W]hatever has received the common assent of civilised nations must have received the assent of our country, and that to
which we have assented along with other nations in general may
properly be called international law, and as such will be acknowledged and applied by our municipal tribunals when legitimate occasions arise for those tribunals to decide questions to
which doctrines of international law may be relevant.
Professor Lauterpacht cited several of the above cases in a very
persuasive article on this subject which was designed to show that "the
law of nations is per se part of the law of the land." 5 He also used two
67. 4 BL. Comm.67; see 10 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISHr LAW 373.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

3 M & S 284 (1814).
1 M & S 92, at 100-6 (1817); see also 14 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 67 at 24.
11 Ves. 283, 285 (1805).
1 B. C. 554, 562 (1823).
2 Bing. 314, 317 (1824).
6 Beav. 1 (1844).
[1905J 2 K.B. 391, at 406.
75. 30 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 51.
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other rules in an attempt to prove his point. First, he observed, the rule
of construction that Acts must be interpreted so as not to conflict with
international law showed the courts' intention to act in accordance with
his "monist" theory. But his argument was not satisfactory, for by admitting that "the absolute superiority of Acts of Parliament even when
they conflict with international law, has indeed been repeatedly and emphatically affirmed" he was in difficulty from the outset. 76 It was indeed
the rule that in interpreting Statutes, they should be presumed not to
conflict with principles of international law, but this presumption would
only be applied in cases of ambiguity and it was, at most, a presumption.
Lauterpacht interpreted the rule in these terms:
[T]he rule of construction is that, while Acts of Parliament are
in every case of overriding effect, they must, if only possible,
be interpreted so as not to be in conflict with international law;
they must be interpreted against the background of international law in the same way as they must be construed by reference to the principles of international law.77
With great respect to the distinguished writer, he appears to have misconstrued the rule. He made no mention of the fact that the presumption
could only be resorted to in cases of ambiguity.7 8 The true rule was that
Parliament would be presumed to have had no intention of violating
international law and the presumption was not applied to any Statute
unless the Statute was ambiguous and appeared to have done so. An
example of the operation of the presumption was shown in the case of
The Le Louis79 in which an Act of Parliament which authorised the
Commanders of English ships of war to seize and prosecute "all ships
and vessels" engaged in the slave trade was construed as not intended
to affect any right or interest of foreigners contrary to the law of nations.8 0 But in that case there was ambiguity of expression. Within the
bounds mentioned, the presumption certainly related international law
to English law, but to suggest that it made the former part of the latter
would not be correct.
Lauterpacht's second argument was that international law need not
be proved in the same way as foreign law, since it was not regarded as
foreign law. He observed that judicial notice was taken of it, in the same
way as such notice was taken of Acts of Parliament."' He admitted that
although his statement illustrated English judicial practice, he could
not trace any judicial pronouncement bearing directly on the matter; 82
76. Id. at 58.

77. Id. at 57.
78. Niboyet v. Niboyet, 4 P.D., 1 (1878).
79. 2 Dods. 210 (1817).
80. See MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 142-5 (11th Ed.).

81. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 75, at 59.
82. ibid.
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and although he criticised Picciotto's contention that international law
must be proved as a question of fact like any other foreign law, he could
not refute it. It is suggested that Lauterpacht was incorrect on this point.
The authorities on the law of evidence state those matters which may
88
be judically noticed, and international law is not amongst them. It
would appear that international law must be proved in court in the same
way as foreign law, namely, by an expert in such law giving evidence to
that effect.
But it is not only by criticising Lauterpacht's views that one can
see the many different and varied arguments against the theory that international law is part of the common law. Several of these arguments
relate to the idea that the 1708 Act granted the ambassador his privileges in English law for the first time. 4
Lord Mansfield, as has been said, quoted Lord Talbot in Barbuit's
case85 as saying that the law of nations was part of the law of England.
In fact, what Lord Talbot said was that "7 Anne cap. 12 ... is only declaratory of the ancient universal jus gentium"; he did not go any further. His editor has added a note to the report of the case, which says
that the law of nations in its fullest extent was, and formed part of, the
law of England. In Triquet v. Bath8 0 Lord Mansfield quotes Lord Talbot,
not from the report of the earlier case, but from a note he had made as
counsel in the case. One writer, at least, was of the opinion that Talbot's
editor added the note to Barbuit's case after reading Mansfield's judgment in the later case. 87 Even if one does not go this far, it would appear
very likely that Mansfield endorsing Talbot's view was in fact Mansfield
interpreting Talbot according to his own view. The other judicial dicta,
although numerous, do not in a single instance show further examination
of the pre-1709 authorities. They were based on Lord Mansfield's judgments and the very pronounced and categoric views of juristic writers
on international law. Each succeeding judgment was also based on the
one before it, so that one is confronted with authority heaped on authority, without any basic facts and reasoning to show that this aspect of
international law had in fact become incorporated into the common law.
Indeed, if we look a little further, we shall find that there were authorities and facts which seem to prove the contrary. There were few cases 8
indeed where diplomatic privilege or immunity as such was granted to
visiting envoys. They may not have been imprisoned, but many were
83. See PHIPSON, EVIDENCE 46-71 (10th Ed.); NOKES, INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE (3rd
Ed.) 53-62.
84. See ADAIR, op. cit. supra note 11, at 239-243; 13 Journal of Comparative Legislation
& InternationalLaw 133; 2 Cambridge HistoricalJournal 290-7.
85. Cas. temp. Tal. 281 (1736).
86. 3 Burr. 1478 (1764).
87. See ADAIR, THE EXTERRITORIALITY OF AMBASSADORS IN THE SIXTEENTH & SEVENTEENTH
CENTURIES

239.

88. Id. at 14.
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quietly recalled and in no case was the privilege successfully pleaded
and upheld. Admittedly, the system of law reporting in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries was not the model of clarity which we have come to
expect of today's reports, but even allowing for the somewhat difficult
explanations and phraseology, one cannot discover an instance of any
such successful plea in a court of common law.
Adding further support, we notice that the men who were responsible
for the assault on Matteuof89 were never punished. The reason would
appear to be that they were punishable by prerogative powers only and
that after the Stuart heyday, the decline in the exercise of the prerogative made it difficult to punish them at all. They had offended neither
statute nor common law principle, and that was the reason for the passing of the Act. That the Act was passed to ensure punishment in the
future is further shown by Queen Anne's letter to the Czar, 9° in which
she said that anyone violating an ambassador's privileges "will be liable
to be the most severe penalties and punishments which the arbitrary
power of the judges shall think fit to inflict upon them and to which no
bounds are given in this new Act." Surely no statement could show
the true position of the new Act more clearly than this. It cannot be
denied that under principles of international law, immunity for ambassadors and their envoys did exist, but they were not enforceable in the
courts before 1709, but rather by prerogative power. The procedure
was that the affronted ambassador would appeal to the monarch who
would refer the matter to the Privy Council; the offender would then
generally be imprisoned at the sovereign's pleasure.
A certain passage from Blackstone's Commentaries would seem to
endorse the view that the 1708 Act was an innovation:
[I]n consequence of this statute, thus declaring and enforcing
the law of nations, these privileges are now to be held part of the
91
law.
Judicial authority in support of this argument is not lacking and one
can find heavy authority for the more realistic view in R. v. Keyn.92
Although it is not a case connected with diplomatic immunity, it bears
direct relation to the problem of international law and common law. In
this case, The Franconiaran into The Strathclyde and as a result of the
collision, a passenger on the latter ship was killed. The German captain of
The Franconiawas charged with manslaughter and the question of jurisdiction arose, since the collision occurred within three miles of English
shores. The applicable rule of international law was that any sea within
that limit should be subject to the jurisdiction of the adjacent shore. A
89.
90.
91.
92.

See 10 Mod. Rep. 4 (1709).
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minority of the judges in the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held that
the court had jurisdiction, on the ground that international law was part
of the law of England. However, the majority of judges agreed that only
those parts of international law were part of English law which can be
proved to have been received into English law. Such reception, said Cockburn, C.J., could be effected by statutory incorporation of international
law, assent of the nations bound by the law, established usage or judicial
decision." He went on to observe that
in the absence of proof of assent as derived from one or other of
these sources, no unanimity on the part of theoretical writers
would warrant the judicial application of the law on the sole
authority of their views and statements.
Following Cockburn, C.J.'s view, Lord Alverstone in West Rand Cent.
Gold Mining Co. v. R.94 observed that the international law sought to be
applied must be proved by satisfactory evidence either to have been
recognised and acted upon in England or to be of such a nature "that it
can hardly be supposed that any civilised state would repudiate it." He
added:
[T]he mere opinions of jurists, however eminent or learned, that
it ought to be so recognised are not in themselves sufficient. 5
In Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. Board of Trade9 6 Atkin,
L.J., observed that "international law as such can confer no rights cognisable in the municipal courts. It is only in so far as the rules of international law are recognized as included in the rules of municipal law that
they are allowed in the municipal courts to give rise to rights and obligations." A similar statement was made in Chung Chi Cheung v. R.9 7 by the
same judge, who observed that "so far, at any rate, as the courts of this
country are concerned, international law has no validity save in so far as
its principles are accepted and adopted by our own domestic law. There
is no external power that imposes its rules on our own code of substantive
law or procedure." 98 In Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S. Cristina,99
which established the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign ship in regard
to its property, Lord Wright said that a rule of international law was
binding "on the municipal courts of this country in the sense, and to the
extent that, it has been received and enforced by these courts." 00 Despite
the weight of English judicial dicta in the above cases to the effect that
international law is not part of the common law unless it is received or
93. Id. at 202-3.
94. [1905) 2 K.B. 391.
95. Emphasis added.
96. [1925] 1 K.B. 271, 295.
97. [1939] A.C. 160.
98. Id. at 167, 168.
99. [1938) A.C. 485.
100. Id. at 502.
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adopted into it, Lauterpacht concludes that English judges are bound by
international law wherever the rules apply. 01'
It is suggested that the arguments in favour of accepting Lauterpacht's conclusion are-less cogent than those against it. In the sphere of
diplomatic immunity prior to 1709, there was no authority for accepting
the proposition that the international principles had become incorporated
into English law and as has been noticed, in no case was immunity successfully pleaded and upheld. It is understandable that international writers
want to suggest that international law is part of the common law, but as
regards this topic, their contentions cannot be accepted. It seems clear
from this survey that the view of Lord Mansfield and those who followed
him, that vox judicis vox Dei non est, and that the Statute of 1708, though
widely thought to be declaratory of the common law, really introduced
this principle of international law into the common law and for the first
time provided penalties for its breach."0 2
101. See similar arguments by Westlake 22 L.Q. REv. 14; Morgenstern, 27 BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 42; 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 3.
102. See 14 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 67, at 31; DiAs, JURISPRUDENCE 154-55
(2d Ed.).

